Without strict rules regulating allocation of shares or setting limits on consolidation, larger fishing operations could easily amass huge shares and run family fishermen out of business.

This happened when the surf clam and ocean quahog IFQ programs off the coast of New Jersey initially gave quota shares to fishermen based on the amount of shellfish each fishing operation caught in the past. Once distributed, these quota shares were transferable. The result was that the number of fishing vessels declined by 74 percent for surf clams and 40 percent for ocean quahogs. The number of shareholders declined by 34 percent for ocean quahogs and 17 percent for surf clams. The General Accounting Office recently found that one entity now controls 27 percent of the surf clam quotas.

If family fishermen are swept aside by corporate control of our fisheries, the rich heritage of fishing in coastal communities could be lost. Instead of an equitable distribution of fish (a public resource) among coastal communities struggling to recover from decades of over- fishing, IFQ programs could concentrate the wealth of the sea in the hands of a few.
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Because IFQ programs often allocate quotas based on the amount of fish a fisherman has caught in the past ‚ his or her "catch history" ‚ smaller, often more conservation-minded, fishermen are excluded. Instead of rewarding these small-scale fishermen with allocations, previous programs often rewarded the large-scale fishermen responsible for past overfishing.

Another problem comes from the fact that quota shares are usually allocated for individual species. Setting aside a portion of a total quota for ecosystem purposes, such as supplying food for other fish in the ecosystem, may require managers to buy quotas from existing shareholders.

Finally, current levels of at-sea and dockside observer coverage are inadequate to monitor whether IFQ programs are having adverse environmental impacts. National standards requiring observer coverage would allow for documenting whether IFQ programs are improving environmental conservation, and would provide information to inform renewal decisions.
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By law, America's fish are a public resource. While existing law states that fishing is a privilege, not a right, IFQ programs further the impression that it is a right because the quota shares are usually allocated permanently. Quota shares held for 10 to 20 years may become de facto property, thereby forcing the U.S. government to compensate fishermen should quota shares be reallocated.

When Congress last debated sunsets for IFQs in 1996, shareholders in the South Atlantic wreck fish fishery flooded Congressional offices with faxes decrying the taking of their private property. To guard against this, IFQ programs and shares should sunset after seven years, after which time they could be renewed if shareholders were improving conservation.
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A referendum is a mechanism to ensure a fair and equitable distribution of quota shares. The permit holders for a particular fishery vote to determine if an IFQ program should be developed and whether they support the specific provisions of the proposed program. A two-thirds majority is usually necessary for the proposal to go forward. This mechanism ensures broad program support within the fishing community.
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A sunset provision requires IFQ programs and shares to end after a certain period of time. They may only be renewed after being reviewed for ecological, economic, and public trust impacts, and it is determined that these impacts are minimal.

This review is critical for two reasons: Because a sunset prevents the impression that a quota share is a property right, and because the review ensures an opportunity for the agencies safeguarding this public resource to analyze performance of IFQ programs for ecological, economic, and public trust concerns.

For example, the IFQ program for groundfish in British Columbia is reviewed every three years. Such reviews allow managers to modify the program as fish populations fluctuate, and they allow for the removal of shareholders who are not meeting conservation objectives, the review of consolidation patterns, and the introduction of new entrants to the fishery.
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The privatization of natural resources in the U.S. has rarely led to enhanced stewardship of those resources. Our extensive national forests, parks, recreation areas, and seashores have all been set aside to protect the long-term health of America's natural resources from exploitation for private economic interests.

Allocating quotas creates an immediate profit motive, an initial windfall for recipients. Without requiring improved conservation, quotas encourage shareholders to accelerate the harvest for short-term economic gain.
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No. The Network wants to ensure that IFQ programs enhance conservation and do not economically damage fishermen and fishing communities. To accomplish this, Congress must adopt national IFQ standards similar to those contained in the "Fishing Quota Standards Act of 2003," H.R. 2621.
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Contact your Congressional representatives in person or send a personalized letter asking him or her to support the national standards contained in H.R. 2621 to protect fishermen, fishing communities, marine ecosystems, and the public trust.
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